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THE  POLITICAL  BRANCHES  AND  THE
LAW OF NATIONS
Anthony J. Bellia Jr.* & Bradford R. Clark†
INTRODUCTION
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S.
Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the
law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations.  As we have
recently argued,1 the Court followed the law of nations not because it
believed such law qualified as “the supreme Law of the Land,”2 but
because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional preroga-
tives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide
momentous questions of war and peace.3  Had the judiciary taken it
upon itself to depart from well-established principles of the law of
nations, it would have usurped the authority of Congress and the Pres-
ident to decide whether, when, and how to depart from such law in
the conduct of foreign relations.  Although we focused primarily on
the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law
of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered also rested
 2010 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark.  Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and
copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law
School.
† William Cranch Research Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School.  For insightful comments, we thank Tricia Bellia, Curt Bradley, John
Manning, Paul Stephan, Ed Swaine, and participants at the Duke Law School Center
for International and Comparative Law Roundtable held on Jan. 30, 2010.
1 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009).
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Constitution recognizes only “This Constitu-
tion,” “the Laws of the United States,” and “Treaties” as “the supreme Law of the
Land.” Id.  For a textual, historical, and structural argument that these are the exclu-
sive sources of supreme federal law, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
3 Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 55–75. R
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on an important, but largely overlooked, predicate—that is, “that the
political branches were free to make law in derogation of the law of
nations, and that such law would bind courts as the supreme law of
the land.”4  Because decisions regarding when and whether to adhere
to—or depart from—the law of nations “are rather questions of policy
than of law,”5 the Constitution’s allocation of powers assigned such
decisions to the political branches of the federal government.6  In
other words, courts generally followed the law of nations in the early
republic not as a form of supreme federal law in itself, but as a means
of preserving the political branches’ exclusive constitutional preroga-
tives to decide whether, when, and how to depart from such law.
Scholars have long debated whether courts should uphold
actions by the political branches that depart from the law of nations.
In addition, some distinguish between congressional and executive
action in this regard.  Most scholars agree that courts must uphold
acts of Congress that depart from the law of nations.  The most promi-
nent advocate of this position is Louis Henkin.  “In principle,” he
claimed, “every state has the power—I do not say the right—to violate
international law and obligation and to suffer the consequences.”7
Indeed, in his view, the Constitution recognizes a “national preroga-
tive to violate international law.”8  “If Congress enacts legislation that
is inconsistent with, and causes the United States to violate, an estab-
lished principle of customary law, the Executive and the courts are
obliged to give effect to the act of Congress.”9  In other words, “Con-
gress, in legislating under its constitutional powers, can enact law
inconsistent with an international agreement or other international
obligation of the United States, thereby causing the United States to
be in violation of that agreement or obligation.”10
A few scholars, however, have asserted that courts should enforce
established rules of customary international law to restrict congres-
4 Id. at 58.
5 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
6 By “depart,” we mean either to violate a customary international law rule with-
out judicial recrimination or to “opt out” of a customary international law rule in a
way that international law recognizes as legitimate. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & G.
Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523906 (analyzing the authority of nations to
withdraw from customary international law rules).
7 Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 931
(1986).
8 Id. at 933.
9 Id. at 933–34.
10 Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1568 (1984).
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sional action.  Jordan Paust, for instance, has argued that “well into
the 20th Century no one expected that the President or Congress
could even authorize a violation of customary international law and
nothing in the text or structure of the Constitution permits such a
result.”11  Jules Lobel has claimed that “fundamental” rules of custom-
ary international law are judicially enforceable against acts of Con-
gress12: “those rules of international law that reflect the fundamental
norms of contemporary society bind Congress . . . domestically as well
as internationally.”13
Scholars have also debated whether customary international law
limits the powers of the President.  Several scholars have concluded
that it does not, albeit for somewhat different reasons.  Some have
argued that customary international law is not judicially enforceable
against the President because it does not have the status of federal
law.14  Others have argued that, as a functional matter, customary
international law is an ineffective constraint on executive action.15
In contrast, several scholars have argued that customary interna-
tional law is judicially enforceable against the President.  Their gen-
eral claim is that customary international law qualifies as the law of the
United States; thus, the President is bound to follow it under the Arti-
cle II duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”16  Even
11 Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law
of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 316 (1999); see also JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 88, 124–25, 143–46, 154–60 (1996)
(arguing that federal officials are bound by customary international law).
12 Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1130–31 (1985).
13 Id. at 1130; see id. at 1131 (suggesting that many of the framers understood the
Constitution to incorporate fundamental international principles as limitations on
government conduct); cf. Henkin, supra note 7, at 933 (“[T]here are plausible argu- R
ments that the Framers accepted customary law as binding on the United States,
including Congress, and that it was intended to be of higher status than the laws of
Congress in the domestic legal hierarchy.”).
14 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 844–46 (1997)
(describing such an argument).
15 See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our
Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226–30 (2007).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No
Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 923, 923 (1986) (“Federal common law is binding on every
executive branch official, including the President. . . . [I]n the face of congressional
silence, he is required to respect a clearly defined and widely accepted norm of cus-
tomary international law.” (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The
Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitu-
tional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1985) [hereinafter Glennon, Raising] (“When the
President acts in the face of congressional silence, federal common law governs the
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so, scholars have recognized limited circumstances in which the Exec-
utive may violate customary international law without judicial
reproach.  First, Professor Henkin has argued that the President may
disregard customary international law if the President is “acting within
his constitutional authority”17 to (1) make law in the United States18
or (2) modify or terminate a principle of international law.19  “The
question,” as Henkin describes it, is whether the President “has consti-
tutional authority to do the act that . . . superseded the customary
principle.”20  Second, numerous scholars have argued that the Presi-
dent may violate customary international law when enforcing an act of
Congress that itself deviates from such law.21  This claim of course pre-
supposes that Congress’s power to deviate from customary interna-
tional law is not subject to judicially enforceable limitations, and that
controversy.  Because federal common law includes norms of customary international
law, presidential violation of certain of those norms should be considered prima facie
unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)); Lobel, supra note 12, at 1119 (“The President R
has a constitutional obligation to execute international law because it is the law of the
land.”); Jordan J. Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?—Foreign
Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 727 (1982)
(“[T]he President of the United States is . . . bound by international law, which is part
of the supreme law of the land under article VI . . . .”).
17 Henkin, supra note 7, at 936. R
18 Id. at 935.  He explains that “the President can supersede a principle of inter-
national law or a treaty by law made under his own authority, in those special circum-
stances when the President has constitutional authority to make law in the United
States.” Id.
19 Id. at 936.  Specifically, Henkin argues that “acting within his constitutional
authority, the President may take actions that have the effect of ending an interna-
tional obligation of the United States with the result that the obligation is no longer
law in the United States.” Id.  Relatedly, Jonathan Charney has argued that the Exec-
utive Branch may violate the law of nations, subject to no judicially enforceable limita-
tions, when it is “participating in the legitimate process of developing customary
international law.”  Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 919
(1985).  “Just as the international system requires that the President be able to enter
into executive agreements and, apparently, to terminate treaties unilaterally, so must
the President have the unilateral power to enter into the international lawmaking
process.” Id. at 917.
20 Henkin, supra note 7, at 935. R
21 See, e.g., Glennon, Raising, supra note 16, at 325 (arguing that “federal com- R
mon law invalidates presidential acts in violation of international law until Congress,
by statute, supersedes the federal common law rule”); Henkin, supra note 7, at 935 R
(arguing that the President must “give effect to an act of Congress that is inconsistent
with a preexisting principle of customary law”); cf. Lobel, supra note 12, at 1119 (“If R
congressional deviation from international law is allowed, there may be limited cir-
cumstances in which the President may also depart from international law.”).
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the President’s duty to take care that acts of Congress be faithfully
executed encompasses statutes that depart from the law of nations.
Different conceptions of the role of customary international law
in our constitutional system partially explain disagreement over the
extent to which such law binds Congress and the President.  If one
believes that the Constitution somehow incorporates customary inter-
national law in its entirety—as superior to enacted statutes of the
United States—then such law presumably binds Congress and the
President to the same extent as the Constitution itself.22  Or, if one
believes that the Constitution authorizes judges to incorporate cus-
tomary international law as federal common law, then such law may
bind the President, absent congressional override.23  Finally, if one
believes that customary international law has no domestic effect unless
and until adopted by the political branches, then such law imposes no
judicially enforceable constraint on either Congress or the
President.24
There is, however, a largely overlooked alternative to these three
accounts that derives from the Constitution’s allocation of powers and
that better explains the Supreme Court’s selective application of the
law of nations since the Founding.  This account maintains that courts
historically followed the law of nations in order to preserve the consti-
tutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign rela-
tions and to decide questions of war and peace on behalf of the
nation.  At the time the Constitution was adopted, the law of nations
recognized a set of “perfect rights” enjoyed by all nations.  These
included the rights to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct diplo-
matic relations, exercise neutral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty.25
These perfect rights were considered so fundamental that interfer-
ence with any of them provided just cause for war.26  Thus, respect for
these rights was essential to maintaining peace among nations.  As we
have previously explained, federal courts upheld the perfect rights of
nations as a means of avoiding war and preserving the constitutional
prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations.27
Accordingly, the Court has long held that any decision to depart from
traditional law of nations principles—and thus risk war with another
country—rests with the political branches, not the courts.
22 Lobel, supra note 12, at 1130–31; Paust, supra note 11, at 316. R
23 Henkin, supra note 7, at 935–36. R
24 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 844–46. R
25 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS *145, *302.
26 Id. at *lxii–lxiii.
27 See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 1. R
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Although this account explains why the Constitution often
required courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, it also
explains why the Constitution—through certain express clauses—
arguably gave Congress more latitude than the President to depart
from the law of nations.  The Constitution vests Congress—rather
than the President—with the express powers to declare war, to raise
and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy.  When the
Court has invoked the law of nations as a limit on executive wartime
power, it has done so in order to uphold its conception of the consti-
tutional allocation of authority between Congress and the President to
decide whether and when the United States should risk starting or
escalating a war by taking action that might violate the perfect rights
of foreign nations.  By requiring executive wartime authority to con-
form to the law of nations, the Court has respected congressional
power to declare and determine the scope of war on behalf of the
nation.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, that as the Court has
gradually recognized shared congressional and presidential powers
over both war and foreign relations, it has also recognized some exec-
utive discretion to depart from the law of nations.
Part I describes the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations
and war powers to Congress and the President.  Part II explains how
the Supreme Court, from the early days of the republic into the twen-
tieth century, has applied certain principles of the law of nations as a
means of respecting the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches to conduct foreign relations.  Had courts departed from
such principles, they would have given other nations just cause for
retaliating against the United States, and thereby usurped political
branch authority to determine momentous questions of war and
peace.  Part III explains how Supreme Court decisions applying the
law of nations necessarily presupposed that the political branches may
depart from the law of nations in the exercise of their respective con-
stitutional powers.  Although we do not attempt to provide a full
account of the respective powers of the political branches to depart
from the law of nations, Part IV offers a separation-of-powers rationale
for why the Court has sometimes limited executive power according to
the law of nations while leaving Congress free to depart from such law.
According to this account, judicial enforcement of the law of nations
against the Executive Branch simply reflects the Court’s understand-
ing of the Constitution’s allocation of powers between Congress and
the President.  The Court has never suggested, however, that the law
of nations could constrain the collective constitutional power of the
political branches.  To the contrary, the Court’s opinions have
expressly and implicitly assumed that the Constitution grants Con-
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gress and the President—in some combination—discretion to depart
from the law of nations in the exercise of their assigned powers.
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S ALLOCATION OF POWERS
The political branches’ power to depart from the law of nations
follows from the Constitution’s allocation of powers.  The Constitu-
tion assigns the conduct of foreign relations—including the power to
recognize foreign nations and make war and peace—to the political
branches of the federal government.  Specifically, Article I gives Con-
gress power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations;”28 “establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization;”29 regulate the value “of foreign
Coin;”30 “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;”31 “declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;”32 “raise and support Armies;”33 “pro-
vide and maintain a Navy;”34 “provide for calling forth the Militia to
. . . repel Invasions;”35 “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the Militia;”36 and “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”37
In addition, Article II establishes that “[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America;”38 that
“[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
28 U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
30 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
31 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  On the implications of this power, see J. Andrew Kent,
Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations,
85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007).
32 U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
33 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
34 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
35 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
36 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
37 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Article I simultaneously restricts the states’ ability to con-
duct their own foreign relations.  Section 10 provides that “[n]o State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  It also prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from
“lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage, keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
will not admit of delay.” Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
38 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States;”39 that “[h]e shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties;”40 that “he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors [and] other
public Ministers and Consuls;”41 and that “he shall receive Ambassa-
dors and other public Ministers.”42
Taken together, these provisions assign responsibility for con-
ducting the most important aspects of foreign relations to the political
branches of the federal government rather than to the judiciary or the
states.  Acting in various combinations, the President, the Senate, and
the Congress are responsible for recognizing foreign governments
and nations, making international agreements, regulating foreign
commerce and intercourse, and making other fundamental decisions
affecting war and peace.  All of these decisions have important foreign
policy implications for the United States.  They necessarily affect the
United States’s bilateral and multilateral relations around the globe.
They affect how our citizens, corporations, diplomats, and military
personnel are treated abroad, and whether the United States has rela-
tively friendly or hostile relations with other nations.  The political
branches take all of these considerations (and more) into account
when making important foreign policy decisions on behalf of the
nation.
II. JUDICIAL ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF NATIONS
Since the early days of the republic, federal courts have followed
rules drawn from the law of nations as a means of respecting the con-
stitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign
relations.  The most important of these rules involved the “perfect
rights” of sovereigns.  In the late eighteenth century, the law of
nations required each nation reciprocally to respect the rights of every
other nation to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct diplomatic
relations, exercise neutral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty.43  These
perfect rights were so fundamental that interference with any of them
39 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
40 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41 Id.
42 Id. art. II, § 3.  The power to send and receive ambassadors enabled the politi-
cal branches, on behalf of the United States, to recognize foreign nations as equal
and independent sovereigns under the law of nations. See Bellia & Clark, supra note
1, at 31–32. R
43 VATTEL, supra note 25, at *145, *302. R
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provided just cause for war.44  Thus, respect for these rights was essen-
tial to maintaining international peace.  Courts recognized the perfect
rights of foreign sovereigns in order to uphold the power of the politi-
cal branches to recognize foreign sovereigns and to avoid usurping
their power to determine war and peace.  By exchanging ambassadors
with a foreign nation, the political branches signaled their recognition
of the nation in question as a coequal sovereign entitled to exercise
and enjoy perfect rights under the law of nations.45  Denial of a
nation’s perfect rights—whether by courts or the political branches—
could trigger hostilities or even war.  Early on, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Constitution assigned decisions of this magnitude
to the political branches, thus requiring courts to follow certain back-
ground principles of the law of nations unless and until the political
branches decided otherwise.
Several early cases illustrate the judiciary’s adherence to the law
of nations as a means of preserving the constitutional prerogatives of
the political branches.  In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,46 the
Supreme Court interpreted an ambiguous federal statute to respect
perfect rights.47  During the undeclared war with France, Congress
enacted the Nonintercourse Act of 1800,48 which prohibited commer-
cial intercourse between residents of the United States and residents
of any French territory.49  The Court concluded that this Act did not
authorize seizure of an American-built vessel sold at a Dutch Island by
an American captain to an American-born Danish burgher, who then
took the vessel to a French island.50  Such a seizure would have inter-
fered with the Netherlands’s perfect rights under the law of nations.
Accordingly, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court famously
declared that a federal statute “ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and con-
sequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as
understood in this country.”51  Because the Act did not plainly curtail
neutral rights, he construed it to be inapplicable to the transaction in
44 Id. at *lxii–lxiii.
45 Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 89. R
46 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
47 For an earlier example, see Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 29–32
(1801).
48 Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7 (1800) (expired 1801).
49 See id. § 1, 2 Stat. at 8.
50 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 64–65, 120–21.
51 Id. at 118.
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question.52  In so doing, Marshall ensured that Congress, rather than
the Court, would determine whether the United States would risk for-
eign conflict by interfering with perfect rights recognized by the law of
nations.53
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon54 illustrates the Supreme
Court’s reliance on the Constitution’s allocation of powers to choose
between competing principles of the law of nations.  The original
owners of a French warship libeled the vessel when it entered the port
of Philadelphia, seeking its return.  They argued that French nationals
had “violently and forcibly taken” the ship from them on the high seas
“in violation of the rights of the libellants, and of the law of nations,”
and that “no sentence or decree of condemnation had been pro-
nounced against her, by any [French] court of competent jurisdic-
tion.”55  The question before the Court was “whether an American
citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed national
vessel [of another country], found within the waters of the United
States.”56  The Court concluded that a citizen cannot bring such an
action notwithstanding the “general statutory provisions” conferring
“the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals.”57  The Court
relied on a distinct (albeit implied) “principle of public [interna-
tional] law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly
power open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted by
the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.”58  In the absence of
contrary instructions from the political branches, the Court consid-
ered itself bound to follow this implied principle of the law of
nations—rather than the competing principle invoked by the plain-
tiff—because failure to do so could provoke hostilities between
nations.  The Court acknowledged that “the sovereign of the place is
52 Id. at 119 (“If it was intended that any American vessel sold to a neutral should,
in the possession of that neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities imposed on
her while she belonged to citizens of the United States, such extraordinary intent
ought to have been plainly expressed.” (emphasis omitted)).
53 See VATTEL, supra note 25, at *336–37 (recognizing perfect right of neutral R
nation to engage in neutral trade); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86
GEO. L.J. 479, 525–26 (1998) (suggesting that courts should adhere to the Charming
Betsy canon to avoid putting “the United States in violation of international law con-
trary to the wishes of the political branches”).
54 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
55 Id. at 117.
56 Id. at 135.
57 Id. at 146.
58 Id. at 145–46.
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capable of destroying this implication,”59 but stressed that it would not
consider the United States to have taken this step “until such power be
exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood.”60  In short, because
exercising jurisdiction over the ship could have amounted to “a judi-
cial declaration of war,”61 the Court insisted that the political
branches—rather than the courts—make the decision to override the
immunity in question.
In The Nereide,62 the Supreme Court again relied on the Constitu-
tion’s allocation of powers in refusing to depart from the perfect
rights of sovereigns under the law of nations.  The case raised the
question whether it was lawful for a commissioned U.S. privateer to
capture goods belonging to a neutral (a Spanish national) that the
privateer found on an enemy (English) vessel.63  According to the
Court, “a neutral has a perfect right to transport his goods in a bellig-
erent vessel.”64  Although “[b]elligerents have a full and perfect right
to capture enemy goods and articles going to their enemy,” the law of
nations rendered neutral goods exempt from capture.65  The captors
asked the Court to disregard this part of the law of nations because
“Spain . . . would subject American property, under similar circum-
stances, to confiscation.”66  Thus, in their view, “the property, claimed
by Spanish subjects in this case, ought to be condemed [sic] as prize
of war.”67  Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected this
argument on the ground that the Constitution required the political
branches—rather than the courts—to decide how to respond to a for-
eign nation’s breach of U.S. rights under the law of nations.  Accord-
ingly, until the government passed an act “apply[ing] to Spain any
rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us,”68
“the Court is bound by the law of nations.”69
These early decisions reveal that the Supreme Court strictly fol-
lowed the law of nations—particularly the perfect rights of sover-
59 Id. at 146.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 126 (argument of counsel).
62 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
63 Id. at 388–90.
64 Id. at 426.
65 Id. at 427.  Like the Court, Vattel described neutral nations to “enjoy perfect
liberty to trade” in “goods which have no relation to war . . . . An attempt to interrupt
or put a stop to this trade would be a violation of the rights of neutral nations, a
flagrant injury to them.” VATTEL, supra note 25, at *336–37 (emphasis omitted). R
66 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 422.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 423.
69 Id.
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eigns—not because it considered such law itself to be part of “the
supreme Law of the Land,” but because adherence to such law was
necessary to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches.  Departure from the law of nations could significantly affect
foreign relations and might even lead to war.  The Court, therefore,
left the decision to depart from such law to those branches of the
federal government charged with conducting foreign relations and
making war and peace.  Indeed, in cases like The Charming Betsy and
The Schooner Exchange, the Court erred on the side of overprotecting
political branch prerogatives by requiring a clear statement from Con-
gress and the President that the United States wished to depart from
the law of nations before the Court would risk foreign conflict by dis-
regarding such law.
III. POLITICAL BRANCH DEPARTURES FROM THE LAW OF NATIONS
The Supreme Court’s early decisions applied the law of nations as
a means of preserving the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches.  These decisions necessarily assumed that the political
branches could depart from the law of nations in the exercise of their
foreign relations powers, and that courts must follow unambiguous
political branch directives of this kind.  These conclusions follow from
the Court’s reliance on the constitutional allocation of powers.
Courts erred on the side of following traditional principles of the law
of nations in order to preserve the political branches’ ability to decide
whether and how to depart from such law in the course of conducting
foreign relations.  If the political branches unambiguously decide to
override the law of nations in the exercise of their constitutional pow-
ers, then the same constitutional allocation of powers requires courts
to follow their lead.
This conclusion is implicit in the Charming Betsy canon.  The
Supreme Court declared that federal statutes “ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”70  The implication of this declaration is that Congress can
depart from the law of nations so long as it does so clearly.  Similarly,
after recognizing an implied immunity for foreign warships under the
law of nations, The Schooner Exchange Court expressly stated that “the
sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication.”71
The only question for the Court was whether the sovereign of the
United States had done so “in a manner not to be misunderstood.”72
70 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
71 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
72 Id.
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Because existing federal statutes did not expressly abrogate this immu-
nity, the Court adhered to the law of nations out of deference to the
political branches.
On the other hand, on the rare occasions when Congress
expressly and unequivocally departed from the law of nations, the
Supreme Court followed its lead.  In The Schooner Adeline,73 for exam-
ple, the Court applied an act of Congress specifying the mode of valu-
ing a ship’s cargo in order to ascertain the amount that recaptors
could recover as salvage.  The recaptors argued that the Court should
assess value according to the law of nations, which provided a more
generous recovery than the statute.  The statute, they argued, was “an
unreasonable departure from an universal usage founded on justice
and common utility.”74  The Court rejected this argument on the
ground that the statute clearly prescribed a different rule: “The stat-
ute is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. . . . We cannot inter-
pose a limitation or qualification upon the terms which the legislature
has not itself imposed . . . .”75  Thus, The Schooner Adeline confirmed
what The Schooner Charming Betsy and The Schooner Exchange presup-
posed: Congress and the President may depart from the law of nations
in the exercise of their constitutional powers and, when they do so in
a manner not to be misunderstood, U.S. courts must give effect to
their directives.
One potential reason that the political branches may decide to
depart from the law of nations is to retaliate against another nation
for its violation of the United States’s rights under the law of nations.
In the face of such foreign violations, litigants have sometimes urged
courts to depart from the law of nations without awaiting instructions
from the political branches.  Historically, courts have refused to initi-
ate such departures in order to preserve the political branches’ exclu-
sive authority to decide whether, when, and how to retaliate against
other nations.  According to the Court, such decisions raise questions
of policy rather than law.  Accordingly, they are committed to the dis-
cretion of the political branches in the exercise of their constitutional
powers to conduct foreign relations and decide questions of war and
peace.
Several cases illustrate the judiciary’s refusal to take the lead in
departing from the law of nations (even in response to an alleged
violation of the law of nations by another nation), and suggest that the
judiciary has traditionally followed such law out of deference to the
73 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244 (1815).
74 Id. at 279–80 (argument of counsel).
75 Id. at 287 (Story, J.).
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political branches.  As discussed, in The Schooner Exchange, the original
owner of a French warship claimed that the ship had been seized by
the French in violation of the law of nations.  He asked the judiciary to
override the protection that foreign warships enjoyed under the law of
nations and return the ship to its rightful owner.  The Supreme Court
declined this invitation.  Once it concluded that warships are immune
under the law of nations, it indicated that courts must adhere to the
immunity unless and until the political branches took action to over-
ride it “in a manner not to be misunderstood.”76  In addition, the
Court signaled that “great weight” should be accorded to the argu-
ments “that the sovereign power of the nation alone is competent to
avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which
such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than law, [and]
that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.”77  Absent
political branch intervention, therefore, courts considered themselves
powerless to depart from the law of nations, even in the face of an
allegation that a foreign state had itself violated the law of nations.
Similarly, in The Nereide, the Supreme Court declined to interfere
with the neutral rights of Spanish nationals to ship their goods on
enemy vessels even though the American captors argued that “Spain
. . . would subject American property, under similar circumstances, to
confiscation.”78  The Court stressed that the Constitution required the
political branches—rather than the courts—to decide how to respond
to a foreign nation’s violation of America’s rights under the law of
nations:
[T]he court is decidedly of opinion that reciprocating to the sub-
jects of a nation, or retaliating on them, its unjust proceedings
towards our citizens, is a political not a legal measure.  It is for the
consideration of the government not of its courts.  The degree and
the kind of retaliation depend entirely on considerations foreign to
this tribunal.  It may be the policy of the nation to avenge its wrongs
in a manner having no affinity to the injury sustained, or it may be
its policy to recede from its full rights and not to avenge them at all.
It is not for its courts to interfere with the proceedings of the nation
and to thwart its views.  It is not for us to depart from the beaten
track prescribed for us, and to tread the devious and intricate path
of politics.79
76 The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
77 Id.
78 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
79 Id. at 422–23.
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In short, the Court made clear that the Constitution’s allocation of
powers precluded the Court from overriding Spain’s rights under the
law of nations, but that the political branches remained free to do so.
Judicial adherence to the law of nations as a means of upholding
political branch prerogatives also explains language in The Paquete
Habana80 that modern commentators often find puzzling.  The ques-
tion presented was whether Spanish “fishing smacks were subject to
capture by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent
[Spanish-American] war.”81  The Court concluded that the “ancient
usage among civilized nations” of exempting coastal fishing vessels
from capture had ripened “into a rule of international law.”82  Accord-
ingly, the Court considered itself bound to follow the rule “where
there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision” to the contrary.83  Those who regard international
law as a form of customary law binding on the United States and its
courts struggle to explain the Court’s suggestion that Congress and
even the President acting alone can override such law.84  The Court’s
suggestion makes sense, however, when one recalls that courts did not
consider the law of nations to apply of its own force as supreme law,
but rather as a means of preserving the Constitution’s allocation of
powers.85  Thus, in the absence of political branch instructions, courts
refused to depart from rules whose violation might trigger or escalate
a war.  The logical corollary, however, is that the political branches
remained free to depart from the law of nations in the exercise of
their foreign relations and war powers, and that courts would follow
their lead.
Finally, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,86 the Supreme
Court afforded a foreign nation even greater protection than the law
of nations conferred by applying the act of state doctrine “in its tradi-
tional formulation”87 to uphold Cuba’s expropriation of sugar compa-
nies in its own territory.  The act of state doctrine reserves to the
political branches the decision whether to restrict or uphold other
nations’ territorial sovereignty by “preclud[ing] the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized
80 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
81 Id. at 686.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 700.
84 See, e.g., Glennon, Raising, supra note 16, at 324 (summarizing commentators’ R
“extensive disagreement as to whether the President may violate international law”).
85 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 78–80. R
86 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
87 Id. at 401.
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foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”88  The
claimant in Sabbatino argued that Cuba had violated customary inter-
national law by discriminatorily confiscating private property belong-
ing to foreign nationals, and that this violation gave the judiciary
license to disregard the act of state doctrine and override the tradi-
tional territorial rights of a foreign sovereign.  As in The Schooner
Exchange, however, the Court rejected this argument as inconsistent
with the Constitution’s allocation of powers.  Any retribution for
Cuba’s alleged violation of international law must be initiated by the
political branches rather than the judiciary.  Even though interna-
tional law no longer recognized an unqualified act of state doctrine,
the Court reasoned that “since the concept of territorial sovereignty is
so deep seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of
another sovereign to accord validity to acts within its territorial bor-
ders.”89  Such judicially generated resentment would interfere with
the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches, and there-
fore undermine the Constitution’s allocation of powers.90  On the
other hand, the Court indicated that the political branches remained
free to abrogate the act of state doctrine as applied to Cuba, and Con-
gress promptly did so following the Court’s decision.91  The same allo-
cation of powers that required the Court to apply the act of state
doctrine in the absence of political branch abrogation compelled the
courts on remand to give effect to Congress’s decision to override the
doctrine.92
IV. ALLOCATING POLITICAL BRANCH AUTHORITY TO DEPART FROM
THE LAW OF NATIONS
To say that the political branches have constitutional power to
depart from the law of nations is not to resolve which branch, alone or
in combination with others, has such power in any given case.  Most
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 431–32.
90 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990)
(stating that the act of state doctrine is best understood as “a consequence of domes-
tic separation of powers”).
91 Following Sabbatino, for example, Congress enacted the second Hickenlooper
Amendment, which limited the act of state doctrine in cases like Sabbatino.  Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964 (Hickenlooper Amendment), Pub. L. No. 88-633,
§§ 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(2006)).
92 On remand, the judiciary applied the statute retroactively to defeat Cuba’s
claim to the proceeds from expropriated sugar.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383
F.2d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 1967).
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commentators agree that Congress may take action contrary to the law
of nations in the exercise of its constitutional powers.  The more con-
troversial question for scholars has been whether the Executive has
unilateral power to depart from the law of nations.  In the first several
decades of the republic, the Supreme Court was skeptical of executive
branch actions that might usurp the powers of Congress to define the
existence of war and determine its limits.  The Supreme Court’s
stance on this question has shifted over time, apparently in accor-
dance with its expanding view of the scope of executive powers.  In
early cases, the Court suggested that the Executive Branch—like the
judicial branch—was bound to follow the law of nations when neces-
sary to preserve Congress’s exclusive power to decide whether and
when to initiate or escalate hostilities with foreign nations.  In later
cases, however, the Court suggested that Congress and the President
had shared responsibility over questions of war and peace, and also
that either branch could depart from the law of nations in the exer-
cise of its constitutional responsibilities.  This brief article is not the
place to explore the relative constitutional powers of Congress and
the President over war and foreign relations.  Our point—descriptive
rather than normative—is that the Court’s view of the Executive’s
power to depart from the law of nations appears to correspond with
the Court’s view of the Executive’s own constitutional power to con-
duct foreign relations and risk hostilities with other nations.  In other
words, as the President’s powers have expanded over time, so too has
his power to depart from the law of nations.
In early cases, such as Brown v. United States,93 the Court explicitly
limited executive wartime authority in order to protect Congress’s
exclusive constitutional authority over wartime policy.  During the
War of 1812 with Great Britain, the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts confiscated British-owned timber found within the
United States after hostilities commenced.94  The U.S. Attorney filed a
libel in federal court to condemn the timber as enemy property,
apparently without the knowledge or consent of the President.95  Such
confiscation, although permitted by the law of nations, would have
escalated hostilities between the warring parties and almost certainly
would have led Britain to confiscate American property as well.  The
Court dismissed the case on the ground that Congress alone possessed
the constitutional authority to authorize confiscation of enemy prop-
erty during wartime.
93 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
94 Id. at 121–23.
95 Id. at 121–22.
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Chief Justice Marshall began by acknowledging that the United
States unquestionably had “power” to condemn enemy property
under the law of nations: “That war gives to the sovereign full right to
take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever
found, is conceded.”96  The Court would not uphold the confiscation,
however, unless Congress authorized it.  Without such authorization,
Marshall thought that confiscation would usurp authority that the
Constitution vested exclusively in Congress.97  Marshall denied that
the international rule subjecting enemy property to confiscation “con-
stitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force,
and not through the sovereign power.”98  War “is not an absolute con-
fiscation of this property, but simply confers the right of confiscation”
upon the sovereign.99  The law of nations principle, then “is a guide
which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will.  The rule, like
other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is
addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot
be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.”100
The question for the Brown Court, therefore, was who exercises
the sovereign will of the United States in deciding whether to confis-
cate enemy property.  Chief Justice Marshall indicated unequivocally
that the Constitution gave Congress the exclusive power to decide this
question: “[F]rom the structure of our government, proceedings to
condemn the property of an enemy found within our territory at the
declaration of war, can be sustained only upon the principle that they
are instituted in execution of some existing law . . . .”101  “Like all
other questions of policy,” the question whether to confiscate enemy
property found within the United States “is proper for the considera-
tion of a department which can modify it at will; not for the considera-
tion of a department which can pursue only the law as it is written.  It
is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive
or judiciary.”102  Thus, “until that will shall be expressed, no power of
condemnation can exist in the Court.”103
96 Id. at 122.
97 Id. at 129.
98 Id. at 128.
99 Id. at 123.
100 Id. at 128; see also id. (“The rule is, in its nature, flexible.  It is subject to infinite
modifications.  It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on political considera-
tions which may continually vary.”).
101 Id. at 123.
102 Id. at 129.
103 Id. at 123.
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Applying this principle, the Court concluded that no act of Con-
gress authorized the confiscation under consideration.  Specifically,
Marshall found that Congress’s declaration of war did not “authorize
proceedings against the persons or property of the enemy found, at
the time, within the territory.”104  Marshall also noted that the U.S.
Attorney had not seized the property “under any instructions from the
president of the United States.”105  Marshall might have been sug-
gesting here that the declaration of war empowered the President to
formally authorize seizures through letters of marque and reprisal or
some other form of instruction, but did not empower U.S. Attorneys
to act without such a formal instruction.  In any event, since “the
power of confiscating enemy property is in the legislature, and . . . the
legislature has not yet declared its will to confiscate property which
was within our territory at the declaration of war,” the U.S. Attorney
was without authority to confiscate the property, and the courts were
without authority to issue a sentence of condemnation.106
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown confirms that the Court
understood questions relating to the law of nations as a function of
the Constitution’s allocation of powers.  Although the law of nations
allowed the United States to confiscate enemy property, this step
would have escalated hostilities between the United States and Great
Britain.  The Brown Court did not believe that the Constitution
authorized either the executive or the judicial branch unilaterally to
take such action.  In the Court’s view, this restriction on executive and
judicial power was not meant to limit the collective foreign relations
powers of the political branches, but rather to uphold Congress’s
exclusive constitutional power to declare war and define its limits.
Thus, Brown rested upon an important constitutional separation of
powers principle—that Congress must determine whether and to what
extent the United States will engage in hostilities with other countries.
104 Id. at 126.
105 Id. at 121–22.
106 Id. at 129.  Although Justice Story dissented, he did not challenge the Court’s
premise that Congress must authorize confiscation of enemy property.  Rather, he
concluded that Congress’s declaration of war in fact included such an authorization.
Justice Story inquired “whether congress (for with them rests the sovereignty of the
nation as to the right of making war, and declaring its limits and effects) have author-
ized the seizure of enemies’ afloat in our ports.” Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting).
Story concluded that the declaration did authorize it, and that even if it did not do so
expressly, the President has “a right to employ all the usual and customary means
acknowledged in war, to carry it into effect.” Id.  Thus, “there being no limitation in
the act, it seems to follow that the executive may authorize the capture of all enemies’
property, wherever, by the law of nations, it may be lawfully seized.” Id.
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The Supreme Court relied on virtually the same understanding
of the Constitution’s allocation of powers ten years earlier in Little v.
Barreme.107  In 1799, during the Quasi-War with France, Congress
passed an act prohibiting ships owned, hired, or employed by U.S.
residents from proceeding “to any port or place within the territory of
the French Republic, or the dependencies thereof.”108  The act
declared that ships violating this prohibition shall be liable to be
seized and forfeited in a condemnation proceeding in U.S. courts.109
In addition, the act authorized the President “to give instructions to
the commanders of the public armed ships of the United States” to
examine ships of the United States on the high seas and to seize any
ships determined to be “bound or sailing to any port or place within
the territory of the French Republic, or her dependencies.”110  The
President thereafter instructed the commanders of the armed vessels
of the United States to prevent all intercourse “between the ports of the
United States, and those of France and her dependencies.”111  He also
urged the commanders not to let American vessels “bound to or from
French ports” to escape.112
In accordance with the President’s command, Captain Little
seized a Danish ship sailing from a French port, brought her to Bos-
ton, and sought to have the ship and its cargo condemned for violat-
ing the act.  The district court directed restoration of the ship and
cargo as neutral property, but declined to award damages against Cap-
tain Little for his capture and detention of the ship.  On appeal, the
circuit court held that damages were appropriate because the capture
was not authorized by statute.  The Supreme Court took the case to
decide the following question: “Is the officer who obeys [the Presi-
dent’s orders] liable for damages sustained by this misconstruction of
the act, or will his orders excuse him.”113  The Court held that Little
was liable for damages and that the President’s orders “cannot . . .
legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass.”114
The Supreme Court’s brief opinion did not expressly rely on an
allocation-of-powers rationale for its decision.  Nonetheless, the deci-
sion makes clear that the Court viewed Congress as possessing sole
107 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
108 Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
111 Id. (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 179.
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and exclusive power to determine the scope of hostilities between the
United States and other nations.  Although the Court conceded that
Congress’s narrow prescription “would be very often evaded,” and that
the President’s broader construction was “much better calculated to
give it effect,” the Court concluded that it was for Congress rather
than the President to decide how best to respond to ongoing hostili-
ties with France.  On this view, the President possessed no indepen-
dent constitutional power to generate or escalate hostilities by
augmenting—or even making more effective—the precise prohibi-
tions adopted by Congress.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown was founded on the same
assumptions regarding the constitutional allocation of powers
between Congress and the President.  Congress had declared war
against Great Britain, but it had not expressly authorized confiscation
of enemy property found within the United States.  Authorizing such
confiscations might or might not be a prudent wartime strategy, but it
almost certainly would have escalated hostilities between the parties
and led to retaliation against American property abroad.  In the
Court’s view, the Constitution reserved decisions of this kind to Con-
gress rather than to the executive or judicial branches.
This view appears to have persisted at least through the Civil War.
In 1862, in the Prize Cases,115 the Supreme Court upheld executive
authority to impose a wartime blockade, but gave no indication that
the President possessed independent power to violate neutral rights
under the law of nations.  At issue was President Lincoln’s decision to
blockade Southern ports following the commencement of the Civil
War.  Lincoln had declared and provided notice of the blockades in
April 1861.116  U.S. ships captured several vessels, rebel and foreign,
violating the blockade, and a U.S. District Court condemned them as
lawful prizes.117  The primary issue on appeal was whether the Presi-
dent had authority to institute the blockade.118
The Court’s opinion made clear that the Constitution authorizes
Congress, not the President, to initiate or declare war on behalf of the
United States:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a
national or foreign war.  It cannot declare war against a State, or any
number of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution.  The
Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power.
115 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
116 Id. at 666.
117 Id. at 637–38.
118 Id. at 665.
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He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  He is
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual
service of the United States.  He has no power to initiate or declare
a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State.119
The Court sustained the President’s blockade of southern ports
not on any sweeping view of executive power, but on the narrow
grounds that a legal state of war existed with inhabitants of states in
rebellion, that the President’s blockade was consistent with the law of
nations, and that Congress had retroactively authorized the Presi-
dent’s conduct.120  Relying on Vattel and other publicists, the Court
explained that under the law of nations a sovereign could treat rebel-
lious states as enemy belligerents.121  Because a state of war existed,
the President—“as the Executive Chief of Government and Com-
mander-in-chief”—had the derivative power to assert the right of prize
and capture as defined by the law of nations:122
The right of prize and capture has its origins in the “jus belli,”
and is governed and adjudged under the law of nations.  To legiti-
mate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a
war must exist de facto, and the neutral must have a knowledge or
notice of the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use this
mode of coercion against a port, city, or territory, in possession of
the other.123
The President’s compliance with the law of nations was necessary
to the Court’s holding that the blockade was consistent with the Con-
stitution’s allocation of powers, particularly Congress’s exclusive
power to initiate war.  Had the President asserted prize and capture
rights against neutrals in violation of the law of nations, he would have
given neutral countries just cause for war against the United States.
The Court made clear, however, that the President “has no power to
initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic
state;” “Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign
war.”124  Accordingly, the Constitution’s allocation of powers con-
strained the President to follow the law of nations in this context.  The
Court also noted—without asserting that it was necessary to uphold
119 Id. at 668.
120 See Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1893–1902 (2010) (discussing the legality of President
Lincoln’s blockade under the law of nations).
121 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666–67.
122 Id. at 666.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 668.
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the President’s conduct—that Congress had, in fact, passed an act rat-
ifying the President’s decision to institute a blockade.125  Thus, as an
alternative holding, the Court stated that “if the President had in any
manner assumed any powers which it was necessary should have the
authority or sanction of Congress, . . . this ratification has operated to
perfectly cure the defect.”126
In 1900, in The Paquete Habana,127 the Court signaled a possible
shift from its position that Congress has exclusive constitutional
authority to abrogate fundamental principles of the law of nations,
and thus precipitate or escalate war.128  As discussed, during the Span-
ish-American War, U.S. armed ships attempted to libel Spanish fishing
vessels as prizes of war.  The law of nations, the Court explained, rec-
ognized an exception for coastal fishing vessels from the ordinary
rules of capture in wartime.129  Neither Congress nor the President
had specifically authorized the seizures, and the Court applied the law
of nations to exempt such vessels from capture.  Read in light of long-
standing precedent, the Court adhered to the law of nations (as it had
in The Schooner Exchange) in order to avoid judicial escalation of hostil-
ities and to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches to conduct war and foreign relations.  Consistent with this
rationale, the Court indicated that the exemption it recognized could
be overridden by a “controlling executive or legislative act.”130  Schol-
ars have long been puzzled by the Court’s suggestion that the Presi-
dent could override international law in prosecuting a war.  If the
Court had followed its approach in Brown, then it might have reserved
the decision whether to depart from international law exclusively to
Congress.  Instead, the Court suggested some measure of overlapping
executive and congressional power to depart from the law of nations.
Of course, the Court had no need to—and made no attempt to—
define the respective powers of the political branches to depart from
the law of nations, either alone or in combination.  But its discussion
does represent a departure from Brown, at least insofar as the Court
acknowledges some executive authority to depart from the law of
nations.
125 Id. at 670.
126 Id. at 671.
127 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
128 Cf. id. at 711–12 (noting that “no act of Congress or order of the President” had
expressly abrogated the law of nations and discussing relevant presidential proclama-
tions (emphasis added)).
129 See id. at 701–06.
130 Id. at 700.
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It is worth observing, as a descriptive matter, that this shift
occurred alongside a contemporaneous shift in the relative war pow-
ers of Congress and the President during the twentieth century.  The
relative powers of Congress and the President in making and con-
ducting war is a complex and controversial topic, beyond the scope of
this Article.  But this much may be said: in the twentieth century, the
President came to assert greater authority to initiate hostilities without
congressional authorization, and the Supreme Court came to
acknowledge that Congress and the President have a degree of shared
constitutional responsibility to conduct foreign relations and formu-
late national policy on questions affecting war and peace.
First, moving from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the
President exercised greater authority to initiate hostilities without
express congressional authorization.  “If practice during the nine-
teenth century was largely faithful to the original understanding of
the war powers, the Constitution came under strain at the turn of the
century.”131  After ordering various small-scale military operations in
the nineteenth century, Presidents asserted greater power to order
hostile military actions without congressional authorization through
the twentieth century.132
Second, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the President has broader wartime authority than early
cases like Brown recognized.  Decisions addressing executive wartime
powers are few, but prominent.  One such case is the Court’s 1936
decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.133 Curtiss-Wright
involved a challenge to a congressional delegation authorizing the
President to prohibit the sale of arms to certain countries engaged in
conflict.  The Court assumed (without deciding) that the delegation
would have been unconstitutional in the domestic context, but
upheld the statute on the ground that the President possessed broad
independent powers in the field of foreign relations.  In particular,
the Court cited “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
131 Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodol-
ogy Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 868 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWER (1996)); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief
at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946 (2008) (examin-
ing “how the political branches have actually considered and treated the legislature’s
power to regulate the President’s ‘command of the forces’ and the ‘conduct of cam-
paigns,’ from 1789 to the present day”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50–56 (1993) (describing early American accounts of
presidential power in foreign affairs and the Supreme Court’s recognition in the
twentieth century of “some independent law-making authority in foreign affairs”).
132 Stromseth, supra note 131, at 868.
133 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations.”134  The Court suggested that, to carry out his
constitutional functions, the President must possess “a degree of dis-
cretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible, were domestic affairs alone involved.”135  Although Curtiss-
Wright has been widely criticized in academic quarters,136 there is no
question that it understood the management of foreign relations—
and the corresponding risk of foreign conflict—to be the shared con-
stitutional responsibility of Congress and the President.137
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,138 Justice Jackson’s
famous concurring opinion described “[m]uch of the Court’s opinion
in Curtiss-Wright” as “dictum,” explaining that Curtiss-Wright involved
only “the question of [the President’s] right to act under and in
accord with an Act of Congress.”139  Although Justice Jackson pulled
back from some of Curtiss-Wright’s language, Jackson himself recog-
nized broader executive authority in foreign relations than the Mar-
shall Court cases contemplated.  First, Jackson described a “zone of
twilight” in which the Executive might exercise “independent presi-
dential responsibility” in foreign affairs.140  Although Justice Jack-
son—and subsequent Courts—have refrained from precisely defining
what those independent powers might be,141 the Court has acknowl-
edged their existence.  Moreover, Justice Jackson explained that
“[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authori-
134 Id. at 320.
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1 (1973).
137 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Exec-
utive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999) (assessing the overlapping
powers of Congress and the President over foreign affairs); Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001)
(arguing that the constitutional text allocates foreign affairs powers between Congress
and the President).  Some commentators maintain that the President also possesses
certain implied powers. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s
Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) (arguing that the President has
“authority to prescribe incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative
scheme”); Monaghan, supra note 131, at 11 (maintaining that the President possesses R
a narrow, inherent power “to protect and defend the personnel, property, and instru-
mentalities of the United States from harm”).
138 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
139 Id. at 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 637.
141 Id.; see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (resolving question of
whether the President had authority to settle foreign claims on the basis of implied
congressional authorization rather than independent presidential power).
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zation of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.”142  After Youngs-
town, the Court has found broad implied congressional authorizations
of presidential war and foreign relations authority.143  In Dames &
Moore v. Regan,144 for instance, the Court asserted that “the enactment
of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s author-
ity in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the
President broad discretion may be considered to ‘invite’ ‘measures on
independent presidential responsibility.’”145  Such reasoning allows
broader executive wartime authority than the Marshall Court recog-
nized in Brown, which limited executive and judicial authority to esca-
late war through condemnation “until [Congress’s] will shall be
expressed.”146
The important point for present purposes is that the Supreme
Court’s recognition of some measure of executive authority to depart
from the law of nations emerged in the twentieth century, as the
Court began to acknowledge greater executive wartime powers.  In
the early period, when the Court understood the Constitution to give
Congress exclusive power over the initiation or escalation of war, it
required both the judicial and the executive branches to follow rules
derived from the law of nations whose violation could trigger hostili-
ties.  In later years, as the President began to exert greater indepen-
dent war powers, the Court suggested in The Paquete Habana that
either political branch may depart from the law of nations in exercis-
ing its constitutional responsibilities over war and foreign relations.
Understanding the Supreme Court’s leading decisions applying
the law of nations as a function of the Constitution’s allocation of
powers sheds new light on longstanding academic debates over the
extent to which such law imposes judicially enforceable limits on the
political branches.  First, the contention that the law of nations
imposes judicially enforceable limitations on congressional power finds
no support in the Court’s cases because the primary goal of these
cases has been to preserve the constitutional prerogative of Congress
to follow, modify, or depart from the law of nations in the exercise of
its war powers.  Second, Supreme Court cases suggest that the Presi-
142 Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
143 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST.
COM. 87 (2002).
144 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
145 Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).  For
a critical evaluation of the Supreme Court’s approach to sole executive agreements,
see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573
(2007).
146 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 123 (1814).
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dent must abide by the law of nations only to the extent necessary to
avoid usurping Congress’s exclusive constitutional authority.  They do
not suggest that the law of nations imposes a judicially enforceable
limitation on executive power when the President is exercising a valid
constitutional power of his own.  In requiring the President to adhere
to traditional perfect rights under the law of nations (in the absence
of congressional authorization to depart from such law), the Court
has historically acted only to uphold the power of Congress to declare
and define the limits of war.  To the extent that the Court now regards
the war power as the shared responsibility of Congress and the Presi-
dent,147 it may be more likely to uphold both congressional and exec-
utive decisions to depart from the law of nations.
CONCLUSION
Modern commentators have suggested that customary interna-
tional law—the modern law of nations—binds the political branches
no less than courts.  This suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the
text, history, and structure of the Constitution.  Absent incorporation
of the law of nations in a federal statute or treaty, the Constitution
traditionally has bound courts to follow the law of nations only when
necessary to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and
the President to conduct foreign relations and make war and peace.
Because departures from certain principles of the law of nations gave
aggrieved nations just cause for war, courts historically followed those
principles as a means of ensuring that the political branches—rather
than courts—made important foreign policy decisions regarding
whether, when, and how to depart from such law.  Given that courts
followed the law of nations in order to uphold the constitutional pre-
rogatives of Congress and the President, it follows that the political
branches possess discretion to depart from such law in the exercise of
their constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and make
fundamental decisions affecting war and peace.  Courts allow such
departures for the same reason that they follow the law of nations in
the absence of such departures: to uphold the Constitution’s alloca-
tion of powers.  To say that the political branches collectively may
depart from the law of nations does not resolve complex questions
relating to the Constitution’s precise allocation of powers between
147 Commentators disagree over how to reconcile Congress’s power to declare war
and the President’s commander-in-chief power. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra
note 131; Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 R
(2002); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understand-
ing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996).
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Congress and the President.  Those questions turn on the proper
understanding of Congress’s and the President’s respective constitu-
tional powers.  Although the Supreme Court’s description of these
powers has shifted over time, it has never questioned the collective
power of the political branches to depart from the law of nations in
the exercise of their constitutional responsibilities.
